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Introduction
This paper examines the trading strategy attributed to Mr. Nicholas Leeson, who was the chief derivatives trader of Barings bank in Singapore. His activities were the main cause of the eventual collapse of Barings bank. The evidence suggests that Leeson followed a doubling strategy: he continuously doubled his position as prices were falling.
Leeson's trading activities mainly involved three futures markets: Futures on the Japanese Nikkei 225 stock index, futures on 10-year Japanese Government bonds (JGB futures) and Euroyen futures. These products are all traded simultaneously and in similar design on SIMEX and on a Japanese exchange. Leeson's main assignment was to arbitrage between SIMEX and the exchanges in Japan and try to capitalize on small price differences between the futures contracts. In reality, however, he was taking massive speculative positions, financing SIMEX' margin requirements by selling options and borrowing huge amounts of money from Barings' head office in London. By the end of February 1995, the losses had become too large and Barings bank went bankrupt.
Our interest in Mr. Leeson comes from the fact that doubling strategies are potentially dangerous from a systemic point of view. An important attribute of doubling strategies is that the inevitable and devastating loss is preceded by a period of high returns with low volatility. Conditional on the bad event not having happened (yet), the doubler's investment performance appears to indicate significant investment skill. The doubler may then become too big to fail, both from the perspective of the investment firm and from the market regulators 1 , so that the inevitable failure can have catastrophic effects, both for the firm and for the market. Among other things, this has important consequences for the 1 As of December 1994 Barings Futures (Singapore) was responsible for 7.86% of the volume of trading on SIMEX making them the second largest trader on that exchange, while at the end of February, just prior to the failure of Barings, they took number one position, with a 8.78% share of the total volume of trades (Lim and Tan (1995) , Appendix 2A).
effectiveness of Value at Risk-controls. Being able to track and take out these traders sooner, would limit possible systemic risks.
Our empirical study follows two paths. First, we examine the raw daily data provided by the exchanges to see whether a doubler may have been active during the period when
Leeson was active. Second, we look at the actual data on Leeson's activities during the final weeks of his career, in order to find out whether Leeson indeed followed a doubling strategy. Based on the analysis of the raw data, we conclude that someone, probably
Leeson, did indeed follow a doubling strategy in these markets. This impression is confirmed when we study his trading immediately prior to the failure of Barings. Leeson clearly expanded his exposure substantially when prices fell, while selling off some of his gains when price rose.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the authorized and unauthorized trading activities which led to the collapse of Barings, Section 3 focuses on the issue of doubling in general. Section 4 discusses previous literature on the relationship between volume and returns. Section 5 presents the data and the methodology, followed by our empirical results in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
The Barings collapse

Background
On As a result of these developments, a new business opportunity arose, in which
Leeson would play a major role, i.e. arbitrage trading of the Nikkei futures contract between SIMEX and the OSE. Apparently, large price differences existed between the two contracts that were very similar in design. The profits from exploiting such price differences between exchanges are small and therefore trading volumes tend to be large.
Still, the risks are low, because every long position on one exchange is offset by a short position on the other. In addition to arbitrage trading, Leeson developed an even more lucrative activity, namely 'switching'. As Barings was able to trade in Japan as well as in Singapore, it could select the cheapest market to execute a client's order. For example, it could tell a client it would buy 1000 Nikkei futures contracts in Osaka, while in reality it made the purchase on SIMEX, where at that moment the price was lower. Barings would charge the client the price quoted on the OSE or slightly better, which was still worse than the price in Singapore. The difference meant extra profit for Barings (SR3.9). This selection of the more profitable location of the two to do business, was referred to as 'switching'.
The end result of all these activities was that the Structured Products Group, which includes Leeson's activities, showed an operating profit over 1994 which was five times what had been planned for that year. Nobody within Barings questioned these impressive figures from a business that should be virtually riskless. In particular in the Nikkei futures market, headquarters believed it occupied a niche, because Barings were members of both the OSE and SIMEX and had developed the business, clientele and reputation to deal in and between those markets (BoE, §3.58-3.60). Chairman Peter Baring concluded that "it is not actually terribly difficult to make money in the securities business" (Leeson, 1996, p.56) . Specifically commenting on Barings' main profit center,
Leeson's direct boss in London, Michael Killian, said in February 1995: "That guy is a turbo arbitrageur!" (BoE, §3.63).
Unauthorized trading
On July 3, 1992, only two days after Barings was granted membership by SIMEX, Leeson opened Account 88888 and that same day, the first transaction was booked in this account (SR3.13). On BFS's system, this account was described as an error account. It is common for traders to set up such an account for the purpose of netting minor trading mistakes.
The net position should be closed each day and the net value of gains and losses incurred in negating the position should be recorded as part of the unit's daily profit (Leeson, 1996, p.38-39) . However, already during the first month of its existence, a large number of transactions were booked in Account 88888, which shows according to the Singapore report (SR3.13) that it could never have been intended to serve solely as an error account.
As a matter of fact, Leeson gave specific instructions around July 8, 1992, to change the software to exclude Account 88888 from all market activity reports and the information was only used for the estimation of SIMEX's margins. In other words, the steps taken by
Leeson in the first days of responsibility for activities of BFS, were to ensure that his actions would not be transparent (Hogan, 1999) . calls.
Despite the manipulations of the books, the funds needed for SIMEX's margin calls steadily increased. Leeson used a number of methods to convince BSL management of the necessity to transfer large sums of money to Singapore. First, he explained that the profits from individual arbitrage transactions are small and therefore trading volumes should be large. Since both exchanges involved in the transaction require separate margins to be deposited, large amounts of money are needed. Second, Leeson claimed that SIMEX demanded so-called "advance margin calls" (SR3.42). Supposedly, these advance margin calls were intra-day margin requirements imposed by SIMEX as a result of volatility in the trading prices of the relevant contracts (SR3.43). Leeson convinced BSL that it was difficult to obtain same day payment from the ultimate client due to differences in time zones. Therefore, BSL had to finance these requirements. In addition to the funds 
Positions in February 1995
The largest part of Barings' losses came from a massive long position in Nikkei futures.
Until October 1993, Leeson's losses were always recovered. After that, losses increased gradually, but accelerated in the final two months leading up to the collapse of Barings. Eventually, on February 23, 1995, Barings was not able to meet its margin requirements on SIMEX. The total loss accumulated by Leeson was US$1.4 billion.
Doubling
That managers take additional risks to escape from a threatening situation is a well-known theme in the field of managerial decision making. For example, Shapira (1997) and Kahneman and Tversky (1986, p. S258) show that people will take greater risks to escape losses than to secure gains. As a consequence, people's behavior tends to change in unexpected and unattractive ways when they are confronted with increasing losses. Thus in finance, where many occupations are high-wire acts, the fear of falling is constantly in the background and sometimes can lure people into disastrous activities. Individuals can become gripped by a frantic panic and may try to conceal these losses, or double up their bets like crazed gamblers trying to punt their way out of their mounting debts. This is the classic gambler's fallacy.
In the case of Leeson, Gapper and Denton (1997) paint a vivid picture of a person who seeks to become the master of the universe, managing to gain a reputation as a star performer. Leeson tried at all cost not to lose that image. When losses were mounting, he followed a strategy of continuously expanding his position. A quote from Leeson (1996) may illustrate our point: "I felt no elation at this success. I was determined to win back the losses. And as the spring wore on, I traded harder and harder, risking more and more. I was well down, but increasingly sure that my doubling up and doubling up would pay off ... I redoubled my exposure. The risk was that the market could crumble down, but on this occasion it carried on upwards ... As the market soared in July [1993] my position translated from a £6 million loss back into glorious profit.
I was so happy that night I didn't think I'd ever go through that kind of tension again. I'd pulled back a large position simply by holding my nerve ... but first thing on Monday morning I found that I had to use the 88888 account again ... it became an addiction." (Leeson, 1996, pp.63-64) .
Our interest in doubling comes from the fact that it is potentially harmful to the system. An important attribute of doubling strategies is that the inevitable and devastating loss is preceded by a period of high returns with low volatility. Conditional on the bad event not having happened (yet), the doubler's investment performance appears to indicate significant investment skill. The doubler may then become too big to fail, both from the perspective of the investment firm and from the market regulators, so that the inevitable failure can have catastrophic effects, both for the firm and for the market. Should Leeson's activities have been discovered and stopped one month earlier, i.e. by the end of January 1995, the total loss would have been about one quarter of the eventual loss. This could probably have been absorbed by Barings, saving the bank as an independent entity (SR.ES36, p.B-i). Kane and DeTrask (1999, p.216) suggest that the Barings management may even have known about Leeson's exposures and allowed him to expand his bets as their only chance to avert disaster.
Return-volume relationships
A doubling strategy implies a relationship between a security's return and its trading volume. This relationship should be asymmetric: in the case of a long (short) position, a price fall (rise) would be followed by a significant volume increase, while a price rise (fall) would not. In addition, a trader following such a strategy may only start doubling his position after the price crosses a certain threshold. This should be distinguished from the information hypothesis that posits a contemporaneous or lagged relation from volume to returns. Under this hypothesis, volume is proxying for the flow of information and changes in investor's expectations (Harris and Raviv, 1993) . There has been some study of the asymmetric relationship between volume and return. Karpoff (1988) and Suominen (1996) suggest that in equity markets the observed positive correlation between volume and returns can be explained by the presence of differential costs in acquiring short and long positions. This asymmetry is not observed in futures markets, since the costs of taking short and long positions in such markets are equal. For example, Kocagil and Shachmurove (1998) calculate the contemporaneous correlation coefficients between the two variables in 16 major U.S. futures markets and find no significant relationship 4 .
One rationalization for a doubling strategy is that it is a way to exploit market inefficiencies, particularly where large volumes of trading can influence market prices.
Indeed Leeson (1996) defends his actions in these terms. This market inefficiency explanation posits an intertemporal causality relationship running from volume to return.
Data and Methodology
Data
Daily information is available for the full period Leeson was active in Singapore, i.e. from For Nikkei futures and options traded on the OSE, we also have transaction data for the period from July 1, 1994, which is 6 months before the Kobe earthquake, until July 1, 1995, which is 4 months after the bankruptcy of Barings. The information includes time to the minute, price (only trades) and trading volume. However, the Japanese dataset does not include quotes.
A first look at the data reveals that the Nikkei futures market, which is the most important market in our study, is very liquid. Table 1 compares daily average trading value of Nikkei futures during five sub-periods of our sample. Please note that the OSE contract has twice the size of the SIMEX contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information on the trading activities of Nick Leeson were collected from secondary material, in particular from the Singapore Report (Lim and Tan, 1995) and the Board of Banking Supervision (1995).
Methodology Price effects: Nikkei futures
Leeson gradually became a dominant player on the Nikkei futures market in Singapore and he clearly believed his actions had price impact 5 . Therefore, a first test is to see whether his trades actually influenced prices during the months leading up to Barings' collapse. His transactions on SIMEX may have led to structural price differences between the OSE and SIMEX. This also provides us with a direct test of the efficiency of the market.
We directly calculate the mean price difference of the two contracts every 15 minutes of the trading day, provided there is a transaction on both exchanges. The prices are based on the last transaction in a given 15-minute interval. We also test Equation (2), using the lagged SIMEX price, because purchases by Leeson which lead to a positive price difference will be followed by arbitrage transactions between the OSE and SIMEX.
5 Indeed Leeson (1996) argues that his relative lack of success in exploiting the consequent price impact was due to other traders intercepting information about his trading activities. Ito and Lin (1996) find some evidence for an increased systemic threat during this period. Finally, period 5 would be a period of stabilization, returning to a 'normal' market.
Doubling and price -volume relationship
We investigate whether Leeson -or some other trader on SIMEX -was involved in doubling transactions. If the doubling story is correct, we would expect to see an asymmetric response of SIMEX volume to price changes: prices go down, volume 6 Quandt (1958 and 1960) proposes a methodology to determine the breakpoints between the time periods endogenously. However, this technology does make the strong assumption that differences in the volatility of price differences is solely due to the activities of Leeson in the markets. The procedure would also identify any changes in trading practices between Singapore and Osaka as being "significant".
increases, with the increase in volume a function of the number of downticks. However, if prices go up we should not see such a strong relationship. Of course, we only have aggregate data, but if it is true that Leeson was such a significant player, we should see his trades in the aggregate data. We should realize that many studies have shown a relationship between trading activity and volatility, but as noted before, Kocagil and Shachmurove (1998) show such asymmetry does not exist in futures markets. In our sample, however, we do expect to find asymmetry between a falling and a rising market, resulting from Leeson's trading strategy. As indicated above, Leeson's losses would increase with a falling Nikkei index and rising JGB futures prices. Hence, we take the spread between the Nikkei futures return and the JGB futures return on day t-1 as the explanatory variable for doubling activities on day t. Formally, we test the following equation for the Nikkei and for the JGB futures market:
where volume t = daily trading volume on SIMEX on day t ∆P t-1 = the logarithmic close-to-close return day t-1
For this test, we split the sample into three periods of approximately 75 trading days each.
Period 1 covers the interval from July 1, 1994 until October 31, 1994, Period 2 from November 1, 1994 until February 23, 1995 , and Period 3 from February 25, 1995 until June 30, 1995 The asymmetry is expected to be strongest in period 2. 8
Doubling: direct tests
As Leeson was betting on rising Japanese share prices and interest rates, we expect the net long Nikkei position and short JGB position to increase as losses increase. Using daily information between January 25 and February 24, 1995 (SR App.3J, p.178), we relate the 7 Quandt's (1958 Quandt's ( , 1960 ) methodology may also be used to determine the appropriate division between the three subperiods. However, the analysis makes the strong hypothesis of homoskedasticity between regimes, while our data indicates that the volatility increased substantially during the period surrounding the Kobe earthquake. 8 Since Leeson partly financed margin requirements on his futures positions by selling Nikkei options, we also tested whether the value of open interest in Nikkei options, both puts and calls, indeed increases when prices fell. The empirical results are weakly supportive.
build-up of new positions in the 88888-account to the cumulated profit and loss. We test the following equation:
where POS t = net Nikkei and JGB futures position after January 25, 1995, on day t CUMG t = the cumulated gain on day t
Results
From the literature it appears that Leeson was an active trader in Nikkei futures on SIMEX. Leeson (1996) shows that during certain periods, he was a very active buyer of Nikkei futures on SIMEX (see Figure 2 ). His desperate attempts to 'double' himself out of the losses increased in the final months of 1994 and, in particular the first two months of 1995. Table 2 presents the results of the T-test. The price difference is calculated as the price on the OSE minus the price on SIMEX.
Over the whole sample, the SIMEX contract appears to be slightly but significantly more expensive than the OSE contract. As expected, price differences during period 1 are insignificant. During period 2 price differences increase and become significant. After the earthquake, the price difference increases even more. After Leeson's departure, price differences decline, but prices in Singapore remain higher than in Osaka. Traders apparently did not demand a discount to hold SIMEX futures during this period of confusion. Finally, the price difference increases slightly in period 5 and remains significant. Table 3 presents the evidence relating to doubling activities in the Nikkei futures market on SIMEX. We take the spread between Nikkei futures return and the JGB futures return on day t-1 to explain increased trading on day t. The wider the spread, the larger the losses Leeson incurred on day t-1, and the more inclined he should have been to double his position on day t. During period 1, the relationship between price movements and trading volume were not significant. During period 2, the relationship between volume and negative price changes becomes highly significant, both economically and statistically. This result is strongly suggestive of doubling activity in this market. In Period 3, after Leeson left the market, the relationship works in a similar direction, probably the result of a reversal in the causal relationship as Leeson's positions were unwound in a falling market.
However, the economic and statistical significance of the negative returnvolume relationship is greatly diminished results is significant at the 1% level.
Conclusions
This paper examines the trading strategy attributed to Mr. Nicholas Leeson, who was the chief derivatives trader of Barings bank in Singapore until the bank's collapse in February 1995. We claim that Leeson followed a doubling strategy: by continuously doubling his position when prices fell, he tried to trade his way out of growing losses. Among other things, this has important consequences for the effectiveness of Value at Risk-controls.
Being able to track and take out these traders sooner, would limit possible systemic risks.
Leeson's trading activities mainly involved three futures markets: Futures on the Nikkei index, futures on 10-year Japanese Government bonds and Euroyen futures. These products are all traded simultaneously and in similar design on SIMEX and on a Japanese exchange. We perform various tests on daily data from all relevant markets, and on transaction data from markets for Nikkei derivatives. Based on the analysis of the raw data, we conclude that someone, probably Leeson, did indeed follow a doubling strategy in the Nikkei futures market. And second, the actual information on Leeson's trading activities confirms that he followed a trading strategy: Leeson clearly expanded his position when prices were falling. 27,000 --------------------Position at the end of the day 27,000 30,000 --------------------Gross long position to be reported to SIMEX via Position Change Sheet (PCS) 27,000 ----------On receiving PCS, SIMEX will show the following outstanding position 27,000 30,000
Margin deposits required will be calculated as follows: Number of gross contracts x margin per contract = (27,000 + 30,000) x margin per contract, = 57,000 x margin per contract 26,000 --------------------Position at the end of the day after the entry of the fictitious trade will be Client A 30,000 Account 88888 (27,000 -26,000) 1,000 --------------------1,000 30,000 --------------------Gross long position to be reported to SIMEX via PCS 1,000 ----------On receiving PCS, SIMEX will compute the outstanding short position as follows 4000 ----------Margin deposits required will then be calculated as follows:
= (1,000 + 4,000) x margin per contract = 5,000 x margin per contract Table 3 Asymmetries in volume-return relationships: Nikkei futures trading on SIMEX
